



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



00371

00 023/40

3/20/73

ATTACHMENT FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: WH Comments on Jack Anderson Column

REFERENCE: Jack Anderson's Washington Navy-Co-Road Column of 3 March 1973: "Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate"

1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced column (copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it contains no new information. To the best knowledge of the Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that E. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and New York.

2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins is purely conjectural and the column takes care to point this out.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WITH HUNT ON THIS OR ANY ITT MATTER. HE HAD ANTICIPATED THAT ANDERSON MIGHT IMPLY SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IN HIS COLUMN AND HAD ASSURED US THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE.

Theodore G. Shackley

Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

[REDACTED]

00373

OFFICIAL MAILING SLIP

1	DIOS	28/1/73	
2	DDIPS	3/11/73	
3			
4			
5	A/EO	14 MAR 1973	
6	File -		

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

This is of interest re
Watergate & also
Seymour Hersh.

00374

FOLD HERE		SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS		NO.	DATE
Executive Officer			12 MAR 1973
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate

By Jack Anderson

Some investigators suspect that the two Chilean burglars taken arrested at the Watergate may also have broken into the Chilean Embassy several weeks earlier. And since Chilean diplomats in New York City, the investigation discovered, have been victims of similar, mysterious break-ins.

In a memo intended for the eyes only of senators investigating ITT's operations in Chile, staff director Jerry Levinson reported: "A source with excellent contacts in the Cuban community told the subcommittee staff that Frank Sturgis had told other people that he and Martinez and Gonzalez, two other Watergate defendants, had broken into the embassy to photograph documents."

Levinson was cautious, however, about implicating ITT in the alleged Chilean caper. "The staff of the subcommittee," he reported, "has developed a number of leads suggesting a relationship between ITT and the team which was arrested at the Watergate." But he stressed "that the case outlined in this memorandum is circumstantial and that there is no hard evidence of ITT involvement."

Suspicious Case

Here, however, is the circumstantial case, which the subcommittee staff has pieced

together from the raw pieces of intelligence "Government and non-government sources alike have told us that the Cuban exile community has a pool of talent which was trained by the CIA and is available for 'dirty tricks.' This talent has been used at one time or another by a number of federal agencies for missions of questionable legality inside and outside of the United States.

"Federal sources report the Cubans to be absolutely loyal, fanatically anti-Communist and willing to take any risk. It is also likely that when teams were assembled for operations, only one or perhaps two members knew who had requested and was financing the operation.

"Washington business and political sources report that about eight months before the Watergate arrest, E. Howard Hunt let it be known around the city that he had a 'team' available for 'Mission Impossible' assignments and that the team would be willing to work for private clients.

"It is possible that E. Howard Hunt, acting as the contractor for the 'team,' had more than one client and that a second client was ITT, which was interested in obtaining information about its negotiations over the fate of its investment in the Chilean Telephone Company. The members of the team may have been recruited, thinking they were doing a patriotic thing to

block a 'Communist' government.

"ITT is the only likely contractor for operations against the Chileans. It claims to have an investment worth \$183 million in the Chilean Telephone Company; it knew that documents were leaking from its files; it asked the Chilean government to move negotiations from Santiago to Washington."

ITT and Watergate

We reported last week on other strange links between the ITT and Watergate scandals. We noted, for example, that acting FBI chief L. Patrick Gray and convicted Watergate felon E. Howard Hunt had been involved in an abortive effort to discredit the famous Dita Beard memo, which tied a \$400,000 political pledge from ITT with a settlement of its antitrust troubles.

The Washington Post reported that Hunt, apparently disguised in an askew red wig, went to Denver to talk to Mrs. Beard about renouncing the memo. We reported that Gray, meanwhile, turned the original memo over to ITT for its experts to try to discredit.

Gray refused to comment when we called the FBI for his response. Questioned by senators under oath, however, he testified that he had not turned the memo over to ITT directly but had delivered it to White House aide John Dean. It was the White House, in

other words, that not only dispatched the burglarized letter to Denver but also passed the document to ITT.

This makes the story even more sordid. It shows that the White House, while denying any involvement with ITT, was working closely with the giant conglomerate to discredit the Dita Beard memo.

The Chilean Embassy burglary was investigated by the FBI, which dismissed it as routine. But Senate investigators disagree. "Careful investigation of the circumstances leads us to the conclusion," Levinson wrote, "that it was not routine.

"Valuable office equipment and cash were left untouched. The Ambassador's office and the office of the First Secretary were both searched and files were inspected. The thieves walked past several more attractive offices to get to the First Secretary's office, suggesting they knew where they were going." The burglarizing of the New York apartments of Chilean diplomats were described in the memo as "similar clean break-ins."

Footnote: Jerry Levinson refused to comment on his memo, which he said wasn't intended for publication. An ITT spokesman called the allegations about Hunt "absolutely and totally untrue." He said ITT had never hired Hunt for any purpose.

NO.	DATE	14, 1954
1	Mr. Security	
2		
3		
4		
5		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	SUPPLY	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER		
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
DDC		
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-57 237 Use previous editions

00375a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INCIDENT REPORT

1. OFFICE CASE NUMBER
2. FIELD OFFICE NUMBER
3. DATE OF INCIDENT

4. LOCATION (CITY AND STATE)		5. NAME OF INCIDENT	
Chile 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.		Burglary II	
6. REPORTED BY		7. ADDRESS	
Hernan Navarro		1705 Market Street, Springfield, Va.	
8. HOME PHONE		9. OFFICE PHONE	
		755-3716	
10. OFFICE ASSIGNED		11. DATE	
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler Sergeant Riley M. Richardson		05-15-72	
		12. HOUR	
		1330 hrs.	
		13. DAY OF WEEK	
		() () 3 4 5 6 () () () T W T F ()	
14. ADDRESS		15. ADDRESS	
N/A		N/A	
16. WITNESS		17. ADDRESS	
N/A		N/A	
		18. HOME PHONE	
		N/A	
		19. OFFICE PHONE	
		N/A	

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEMS)

At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-
Control Center was advised by M.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place at the
Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., sometime between 1600 hours on
Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0855 hours this date.

Sergeant Riley M. Richardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately
1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.

The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (NMI) Navarro, Administrative Counselor
of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices
were ransacked. At this time the method of entry or items taken is unknown.
Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Command
when determination of missing articles is made. (continued)

jam (USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)

23. PHOTOS
 YES NO
 FBI

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(1) RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(2) RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

25. ARREST PD	26. ARREST NO.	27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME AND D-ONE NO.)	28. DATE OF ARREST	29. HOUR

30. INCIDENT STATUS
 A. OPEN
 B. CLOSED
 C. UNFOUNDED
 D. CLEARED BY ARREST

31. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE) HOUR		DATE	32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)		DATE
<i>Sgt. Stevens E. Butler</i>		05-15-72	<i>Pete N. Manthos</i>		05-15-72
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler		1500 hrs.	Captain Pete N. Manthos		1505 hrs.
33. STATE/DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED			DATE:		34. USSS-ID CASE NO.
N/A					N/A 00376

2. NAME OF INCIDENT

Quarry II

3. INCIDENT DATE

1/15/72

7. PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF INCIDENTS

4. OFFENSE

785 Market Street, Springfield, Va

6. REPORTING OFFICER
Name: [Redacted]
Title: [Redacted]

The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifford O. Gill, Badge # 147, M.P.D.C., 30, and Officer Michael S. Mandella, Badge # 3110, M.P.D.C., 30, also M.P. Boat Cruiser # 735.

S/A [Redacted] USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

N/A

(1) LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
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RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
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(2) LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
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RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
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9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR
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14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> UNFOUNDED <input type="checkbox"/> CLEARED BY ARREST	15. USSS-ID CASE NO. N/A
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16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION OPEN	00377
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17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE) Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	18. DATE 05-15-72	19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE) Captain Pete N. Manthos	20. DATE 05-15
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Maglary II

Mano (MNL) Manzano

2001 N. Oak Street, Springfield, Va

271-3120
MAY 15 1972

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Manzano contacted Officer Adrian Ramos-Gonzalez at 1310 E. Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing: (4) Portable Radios, one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radios and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/PM Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver and one (1) Women's pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.

5278 

8. SUSPECT AND/OR-ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

(1):	LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS
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RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
------	-----	--------	--------	------	------	---------------	---------------------	-------------

(2):	LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS
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RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
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9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR
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14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION	15. USSS-10 CASE NO.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> UNFOUNDED <input type="checkbox"/> CLEARED BY ARREST	N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION	00378
OPEN	

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)	18. DATE	19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)	20. DATE
<i>Sgt. Steven E. Butler</i> Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	05-15-72	<i>Pete N. Manthos</i> Captain Pete N. Manthos	05-15-

14. POLICE DISTRICT		15. DIV.		16. UNIT		17. P.A.		1. S. CITY ADDRESS		2. HOME PHONE	
3.0		-		-		-		Embassy of Chile 1736 MASS. AVE N.W.		N/A	
18. TYPE OF CASE		7. SEX		8. RACE		9. JOB		10. CRIME		3. HOME PHONE	
N/A		M		W		N/A		BURG-715		735-1771	
19. TYPE OF VEHICLE		11. MAKE		12. MODEL		13. COLOR		14. LOCATION OF CRIME (STREET)		15. DATE, TIME	
N/A		A		-		-		1736 MASS AVE N.W.		5/15/72	
20. MAKE		21. MODEL		22. COLOR		23. WEAPON, TOOL, TRACE OR PRINTS USED		24. METHOD USED		16. CLASSIFICATION	
-		-		-		UNK		UNK		F5	
25. NAME (Last, First, Middle)		26. CODE		27. RES. ADDRESS		28. HOME PHONE		29. BUS. PHONE		17. CLASSIFICATION	
NAVARRO, HERMAN		R		7605 Hamlet St. Springfield, VA		321-7121		735-1771		F5	
28. Administrative Counselor											

25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Name, Address, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (omit description if arrested)

25 N/A

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY		27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE?		28. TRANSPORTED BY		29. TREATED BY	
N/A		N/A		N/A		N/A	
30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN		31. LOSS VALUE		32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT		33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY	
UNK		UNK		N/A		Inside Embassy	
34. POINT OF ENTRY		35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED		36. NARRATIVE:		37. DATE/TIME TYPE NO.	
UNK		N/A		<p>(1) CONTINUATIONS OF ABOVE ITEMS (INDICATE ITEM NUMBER) INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS AS OBTAINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIBE EVIDENCE AS PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION REPORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM.</p>		38. REPRODUCE NO.	

R-1 Reports Between The hours of 1600, 5-15-72 and 0855, 5-15-72 The Embassy of Chile was entered and ALL THE OFFICES RANSACKED. UNKNOWN WHAT WAS TAKEN AT THIS FULL Report To Follow Later. CRU 244 SGT GILL ON SCENE. PRINT CRU 735 ON SCENE OFF LEITZ OF E.P.S. NOTIFIED AT 1330 HRS.

39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.		40. STATUS (Check One)		41. UNIT REFERRED TO		42. UCR DISPOSITION	
M.S. KURDILHA 30 3770		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> UNFOUNDED <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED					
43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.		44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING UNIT & BADGE NO.		45. REVIEWER		46. REPRODUCE NO.	
B.L. DUNNING		SGT C.O. GILL 147				00379	



23

UNCLASSIFIED 154

OGC [Redacted]

FILE

S-16-72

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 02473 162301Z

72
ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 CPR-02 SY-03 USSS-00 NSC-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 F-03 RSC-01 USIA-12 PRS-01
RSR-01 /070 W 016973

R 162244Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1236

UNCLAS SANTIAGO 2473

SUBJ: UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO CHILEAN EMBASSY; FONMIN STATEMENT
REF: SANTIAGO 2450 *Pol 17 Chile US*

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED) FONMIN UNDERSECRETARY PALMA GAVE PRESS EVENING MAY 15. QUOTE: CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN US HAS INFORMED THIS MINISTRY THAT OVER WEEKEND CHANCERY OF EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ENTERED ILLEGALLY (VIOLADA) BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS WHO PROCEEDED TO FORCE OPEN DESKS AND KARDEXES OF EMBASSY'S POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICE.

OTHER CHANCERY OFFICES, IN ADDITION, WERE ENTERED ILLEGALLY ALBEIT ON LESSER SCALE. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED REMOVAL OF DOCUMENTS, BOOKS, RADIOS, ETC. AS RESULT THESE SERIOUS ACTS, CHILEAN AMB TO US ADVISED STATE DEPT WHICH EXPRESSED ITS DEEP REGRET AT WHAT HAD OCCURED.

"THIS AFTERNOON UNDERSECRETARY CALLED IN US AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS GOC'S CONCERN ABOUT SECURITY OF ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN US, REQUESTING RAPID AND RIGOROUS INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICE GUARD TO PREVENT REALIZATION OF THESE LAMENTABLE ABUSES (DESMANES).

"FOR ITS PART OUR GOVT HAS ADOPTED MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THESE SECURITY OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS AND OBLIGATORY INVESTIGATION (SUMARIO) HAS BEEN ORDERED. UNQUOTE.

2. VIRTUALLY ALL SANTIAGO DAILIES THIS MORNING CARRY TEXT OR FAITHFUL SUMMARIES PALMA STATEMENT WITHOUT COMMENT OR FANCIFUL

1



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SANTIA 02473 162301Z

HEADLINES. STORY BANNERED ACROSS FRONT PAGE, HOWEVER, BY
COMMUNIST EL SIGLO AND INDEPENDENT LA TERCERA. GOVT TV
NETWORK NEWS LAST EVENING RAN ANNOUNCEMENT AGAINST BACKDROP
OF ITT EXPOSE POSTER.
DAVIS

00381

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 650

OGC
FILE

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 2450 152326Z

71
ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-01 CPR-02 SY-03 USSS-03 CIAE-03 DODE-00 INR-06
NSAF-00 P-03 OSC-01 USIA-10 PRS-01 SS-14 NSC-10 RSR-01

1970 W

008831

R 152306Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1218

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 2450

SUBJECT: UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO CHILEAN EMBASSY

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY SUB-SECRETARY PALMA ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM TODAY AT 5:30 P.M. I JUST READ A STORY FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO CHILEAN EMBASSY - AND KNEW WHAT TO EXPECT. PALMA EMPHASIZED THAT AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE SHOWED SIGNS OF HAVING BEEN CAREFULLY SEARCHED FOR PAPERS WHILE VALUARLES HAD NOT BEEN TOUCHED. HE SAID CHILEAN GOVERNMENT ASSUMED MOTIVE HAD BEEN POLITICAL. FROM HIS OWN RECENT EXPERIENCE IN WASHINGTON, PALMA SAID, HE KNEW PROTECTION GIVEN CHILEAN EMBASSY WAS LESS EFFECTIVE THAN IT MIGHT BE. HE SAID CHILEAN GOVERNMENT MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT U.S. OFFICES AND RESIDENCES IN SANTIAGO IN PART BECAUSE OF DELICACY OF OUR RELATIONS - AND HE THOUGHT USG SHOULD ALSO STRIVE TO GIVE CHILEAN OFFICES AND HOMES BETTER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL PROTECTION. PALMA ASSURED ME THAT GOC HAS NO DESIRE THAT THIS INCIDENT BE MAGNIFIED. IN FACT, HE APPEARED SLIGHTLY TAKEN ABACK WHEN I MENTIONED THAT INCIDENT WAS ALREADY ON PRESS SERVICE WIRES.

2. I EXPRESSED REGRET THAT INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED AND THANKED PALMA FOR PROTECTION U.S. OFFICES ARE RECEIVING. (CARABINEROS BROKE UP DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF CONSULATE A FEW HOURS AGO.) I SAID I WOULD PASS ON GOC REQUEST FOR INCREASED PROTECTION.

3. STATE R4655 ARRIVED A FEW MOMENTS AGO. PALMA MADE NO MENTION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE OR THEFT OF RADIO.

DAVIS

00382

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM DS 322(COR)

XR SEC 11

08465

084655 | 151903Z MAY 72 | ROGERS

OGC
FILE



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ARA/BC/C:LGIRDLER
5/15/72 EXT 22575
ARA/BC:JWFISHER

S/CPR:HDAVIS

IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO

JMF
LG

SUBJ: BREAK-IN AT CHILEAN CHANCERY

1. CHILEAN MINCOUNS VALDES PHONED DEPT (FISHER) MORNING MAY 15 TO REPORT THAT UPON ARRIVAL SAME MORNING THEY DISCOVERED PERSON OR PERSONS UNKNOWN HAD ENTERED CHANCERY (APPARENTLY SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY NIGHT) AND HAD SEARCHED SEVERAL OFFICES AND TAKEN SOME RADIOS AND BOOKS. DEPT IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES THROUGH PROTOGOL AND SY CHANNELS, AND DEPTOFF (GIRDLER) VISITED CHANCERY TO EXPRESS CONCERN AND REGRET.

2. DURING VISIT, AMB LETELIER AND EMBOFFS DISMISSED ROBBERY AS POSSIBLE MOTIVE, STATING IT IMPOSSIBLE CONCEIVE THAT FOREIGN CHANCERY LOGICAL TARGET FOR STRAIGHT ROBBERY AND CONCLUDING THAT REAL PURPOSE WAS SEARCH FOR (UNSPECIFIED) DOCUMENTS. WHILE TERNING INCIDENT "DISAGREE-ABLE" THEY MADE NO HINT OF, OR REFERENCE TO, POSSIBLE PROTEST OR CLAIM FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE. YY

(2)

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO STATE Dept.

00383

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OGC 73-0930
25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chilean Embassy Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson, General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved in a break in at the Chilean Embassy in Washington, D. C. on 15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identified two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated 15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest of the Chilean Government presented to the American Embassy, and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated 15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service. I then called [redacted] at Secret Service and he had his liaison man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent [redacted] stating that he had received a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry about prosecution. [redacted] indicated that the FBI Washington Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at the Chilean Embassy between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

00384



JOHN P. ROCHE

The CIA and Allende

The current imbroglio over the role that the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. played (or considered playing) in trying to block the election of Chilean President Allende has its tantalizing and perplexing aspects. Was the CIA's cash balance so low it needed a million dollars from IT&T? Did the CIA and IT&T really think they could pull off some of the stunts contemplated without the word getting out and working massively in favor of Allende? But underlying this brawl are a series of very difficult questions of principle, to say nothing of definition.

First of all, what constitutes American (public or private) intervention in the internal affairs of another state? Obviously, sponsoring a revolution (as Teddy Roosevelt did to break Panama loose from Colombia) is at one pole. But between sponsoring revolutions and totally eliminating any American activity outside of the United States, there is a long line on the spectrum, a line that gets fuzzier and fuzzier the further you go.

Moreover, even doing nothing can be construed as intervention: Egypt's President Nasser thought that Secretary Dulles' refusal to help finance the Aswan Dam was a form of intervention, and some years ago six coffee-producing nations in Latin America protested to the Organization of American States that our refusal to rig coffee prices intervened in their internal affairs.

I would argue that the very existence of the United States as the most powerful nation in the world automatically intervenes in the affairs of every other state. Nasser and the coffee producers were right: Inaction on our part can have as great an impact as action. To take a vivid instance, if we had not shipped military equipment to Britain before Pearl Harbor, the war for Europe could have been lost.

If we accept that proposition, the futile argument over whether we should intervene automatically goes by the boards. Then we turn to the hard one: To what ends should we (publicly and privately) intervene?

Should we protect democratic (or even un-democratic) nations from totalitarian invasion or subversion? Should we utilize our foreign aid to nourish democratic political development -- as is provided in the Fraser Amendment to the foreign aid bill -- or should we take a strictly hands-off approach?

It is at this point that the IT&T fracas comes back into focus, and as ideological shambles occurs. Let us suppose for a moment that the Chase Manhattan Bank, influenced by the World Council of Churches and black militants, decided to provide a conduit to black liberation movements in South Africa, using its business connections to provide arms and other aid to the revolutionaries. Would this be a "bad" thing? Was it a "bad" thing when the CIA, using a business cover, shipped into Santo Domingo the weapons used to kill the brutal dictator Trujillo? (I don't know how he feels about it today, but in 1961 the Dominican statesman Juan Bosch thought that intervention was the greatest thing since the discovery of America.)

What this comes down to is that intervention is a "good" thing when you happen to favor the cause involved, but is wicked and immoral if you disapprove of the goals. A perfectly human response; but hardly one on which sound public policy can be formulated. The thought of IT&T losing its Chilean assets does not bring tears to my eyes or lead me to wish we still had a supply of gunboats in stock. Capitalism, I'm told, involves taking risks, and the corporation may in the end be reimbursed by a federal agency set up to provide insurance for such contingencies.

No, what bothers me is the wholly ad hoc reaction of the Senate committee investigating the matter. We would be far better served by Sen. Church and his colleagues if they spent less time being outraged and a little more trying to formulate general guidelines, guidelines which would apply to South America and South Africa, to the just and the unjust alike, however defined.

Colby!
→ true?

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

Do 7f

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM : Chief, Division D
SUBJECT : Potentially Embarrassing Activities
Conducted by Division D
REFERENCE : Your staff meeting, 7 May 1973

1. There is one instance of an activity by Division D, with which you are already familiar, which the Agency General Counsel has ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: the collection [redacted] of international commercial radio telephone conversations between several Latin American cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related communications. The background on this is briefly as follows:

[redacted] Therefore on 29 September 1972 NSA asked if Division D would take over the coverage, and on 12 October 1972 we agreed to do so. On 14 October a team of intercept operators from the [redacted] [redacted] began the coverage experimentally. On 15 January 1973, NSA wrote to say that the test results were good, and that it was hoped this coverage could continue.

Because a question had arisen within Division D as to the legality of this activity, a query was addressed to the General Counsel on this score (Attachment A hereto). With the receipt of his reply (Attachment B), the intercept activity was immediately terminated. There has been a subsequent series of exchanges between Division D and the General Counsel as to the legality of radio intercepts made outside the U.S., but with one terminal being in the U.S., and the General Counsel

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA's statutory responsibilities.

2. We are carrying out at present one intercept activity which falls within this technical limitation--i.e., of having one terminal in the U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] since the [REDACTED] link being monitored carries a large number of totally unrelated conversations, the operators do intercept other traffic, frequently involving U.S. citizens--for example, BNDD staffers talking to their agents. I have described this situation to the General Counsel, and his informal judgment was that, as long as the primary purpose of the coverage is a foreign target, this is acceptable. He suggests, however, that it might be desirable to inform the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept of the conversations of U.S. citizens, and thus legalize this activity. We will pursue this with Mr. Houston.

[REDACTED]

4. An incident which was entirely innocent but is certainly subject to misinterpretation has to do with an equipment test run by CIA [REDACTED] technicians in Miami in August 1971. At that time we were working jointly to develop short-range agent DF equipment for use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. [REDACTED] and a field test was agreed upon. The Miami area was chosen, and a team consisting of Division D, Commo, [REDACTED] personnel went to Miami during the second week of August. Contact was made with a Detective Sergeant [REDACTED] of the Miami Beach Police Department, and tests were made from four different hotels, one a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and Convention Hall. A desk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that the team was part of the official security checking process of all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had already been checking for possible sniper sites.) As the team's report notes, "The cover for the use of the hotel is a natural."

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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

5. Another subject worthy of mention is the following:

In February 1972, [Redacted]

[Redacted] contacts in U.S. telecommunications companies [Redacted]

[Redacted] for copies of the telephone call slips pertaining to U.S.-China calls. These were then obtained regularly by Domestic Contact Service in New York, pouched to DCS Washington, and turned over to Division D for passage to FE/China Operations. The DDP was apprised of this activity by Division D in March 1972, and on 28 April 1972 Division D told DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up, and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In an advisory opinion, the Office of General Counsel stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communications Act, inasmuch as they are a part of a normal record-keeping function of the telephone company, which does not in any way involve eavesdropping.

[Large Redacted Area]

Atts:

A. DivD memo to OGC 26 Jan 73

B. OGC memo to DivD 29 Jan 73

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

26 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Intercept of Communications in the U. S.

1. CIA is intercepting at our communications site [Redacted] high frequency, international radio telephone calls originating [Redacted] in New York and being broadcast to South America or being directed to New York from South America. Some calls are relay calls through New York but not originating or terminating there. The calls involve both U. S. citizens and foreign nationals.

2. [Redacted] the intercept team screens the telephone calls for drug-related matters. NSA receives the traffic from CIA in the form of magnetic tape. [Redacted]

3. I would appreciate your very early views as to where this intercept activity falls with respect to U. S. law. Even if it is legal or we can secure the necessary authorizations, it seems to me there is extra flap potential associated with reports going into the BNDD mechanism, particularly since they may well become the basis for executive action.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (Signed) [Redacted]
Acting Chief, [Redacted]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Count 1
DO-44
8 May 73

SUBJECT: The [M]CHAOS Program

1. The [M]CHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The [M]CHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to [M]CHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the [redacted] aspect of the [redacted] project of the East Asia Division is similar to the [M]CHAOS PROGRAM.

U.S. citizens recruited to go abroad

3. As indicated earlier, [M]CHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets

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have been recruited and run exclusively for the ~~[M]~~CHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of ~~[China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations.]~~ Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the ~~[M]~~CHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The ~~[M]~~CHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

a. 



b. 



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5. [M]CHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the [M]CHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. (It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division.) The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

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